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Abstract 
 
Reliance on private partners to help provide infrastructure 
investment and service delivery is increasing in the United 
States. Numerous studies have examined the determinants of 
the degree of private participation in infrastructure projects 
as governed by contract type. We depart from this simple 
public/private dichotomy by examining a rich set of 
contractual arrangements. We utilize both municipal and 
state-level data on 472 projects of various types completed 
between 1985 and 2008. Our estimates indicate that 
infrastructure characteristics, particularly those that reflect 
“stand alone” versus network characteristics, are key factors 
influencing the extent of private participation. Fiscal 
variables, such as a jurisdiction’s relative debt level, and basic 
controls, such as population and locality of government, 
increase the degree of private participation, while a greater 
tax burden reduces private participation. 
JEL classification: H4; H54; H7; L88; L9 
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1. Introduction
Critical parts of America’s infrastructure are deteriorating and past their original design 
lives.1 State and local governments responsible for that infrastructure often face severe fiscal 
problems, and do not possess the resources necessary to properly expand and maintain it. 
Federal funds for infrastructure maintenance are also dwindling. America’s infrastructure 
challenges span a variety of facilities and sectors, including roads, bridges, tunnels, transit 
systems, dams, schools, and wastewater treatment plants, among others. 
State and local governments are turning to the private sector for assistance with the 
design, financing, construction, expansion, maintenance and operation of critical infrastructure 
facilities. Thirty-one states have passed public-private partnership enabling laws, which are 
designed to facilitate private participation in infrastructure provision and operation.
This type of cooperation typically occurs through a contractual agreement between a 
group of private partners and a public project sponsor. Agreements can take on many forms. 
Private participation can occur through simple management contracts, where a private party is 
retained to operate existing facilities, such as schools, prisons, or toll roads. It can also occur 
through more complex end-to-end contracts where the private party designs, finances, constructs, 
and operates entirely new facilities. Private participation thus varies widely in intensity across 
different contract types. 
Scholarly literature on contracts between the government and private partners is growing.
Many works focus on the choice between public versus private delivery of public services (Bel and 
Fageda 2007, 2009 provide respectively reviews and meta-regression analyses), as well as works 
that analyze delivery reform choices beyond a simple public-private distinction (i.e. Warner and 
Hebdon, 2001, Warner and Hefetz 2002, Duffield, 2010). However, there has not yet been 
systematic empirical study of the factors driving the choice of the degree of private participation. 
We address that gap by categorizing private participation in infrastructure provision and operation 
into four main contractual types: design and build, management contracts, design-build-finance-
operate (DBFO) agreements and concession agreements, and asset sales. We discuss each 
contract type below. We use both binary logistic and ordered logistic regression analysis to 
examine the effect of a broad set of fiscal, political, and infrastructure-type variables on the type of 
contract used. 
1 See e.g. American Society of Civil Engineers, “Report Card for America’s Infrastructure,” available at: 
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/ (accessed August 27, 2012).
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Analyzing the degree of private involvement in the delivery of public infrastructure –
beyond the traditional approach of studying determinants of the decision of whether to privatize or 
not – is important given increasing private involvement in infrastructure projects in the United 
States. Between 1990 and 2000 there were a total of 26 projects valued at $14.4 billion. Between 
2001 and 2010, however, there were 46 projects valued at $34.8 billion. This represents a 
decade-over-decade increase of 77 percent in the total number of projects, and a 140 percent 
increase in value.
A salient characteristic of the projects is that private partners bear risks inherent in the 
construction and operation of the public infrastructure. Indeed, the degree of risk sharing and risk 
transfer to private agents is linked directly to the degree of private involvement, as indicated in 
works such as the Asian Development Bank (2008: 28). Public-Private Partnerships Handbook,
which distinguishes between five basic types of projects (including service contracts, 
management contracts, lease contracts, concessions, and build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts, 
on the basis of differences in (i) commercial risk (associated with demand risk); and (ii) overall 
level of risk assumed by the private sector.2
Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide evidence directly analyzing the drivers of 
contract choice in agreements that correspond to different levels of private involvement. We 
extend literature examining the determinants of contracting out decisions in order to focus on 
projects already “privatized” through contractual agreements and on the extent of risk assumption 
by the private partner. We thus move beyond treatment of the public/private choice as 
dichotomous. Second, after controlling for fiscal and political effects, we show that stand alone 
versus network characteristics of the infrastructure in question are leading factors explaining 
contract choice in the United States. We find that network characteristics, such as those related to 
transaction costs, sunk investments, and limited competition, are important drivers of the degree 
of private participation.
We next describe contract types in more detail, review some common contractual types, 
and provide examples of several contract types in the United States. Section III provides an 
overview of related literature. We describe our data set and both the dependent and independent 
variables we study in Section IV. Section V describes our empirical strategy, while Section VI 
reports and discusses empirical estimates. Section VII concludes. 
2 Among other factors. See as well for this purpose Anthony Boardman, Carsten Greve and Graeme A. Hodge, eds. 
(2010), International Handbook On Public–Private Partnerships, Edward Elgar.
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2. Types of Contracts
We consider contracts ranging from relatively simple management contracts to complex 
design-build-finance-operate (DFBO) contracts, to outright asset sales. The traditional 
procurement approach has long included private sector participation, but in more limited ways. 
Under a traditional design-build (DB) approach, for example, a public sponsor engages (typically 
different) private firms to design and construct an infrastructure project. The public sponsor 
remains responsible for financing, operating, and maintaining the facility. 
More complex contractual arrangements extend the traditional approach in that they enlist 
the private sector in undertaking a variety of added tasks, thus bundling different aspects of 
service provision. Such arrangements are sometimes called public-private-partnerships (Iossa 
and Martimort, 2011). One such arrangement is a design-build-operate-maintain, or DBOM 
contract, under which the additional duties of the private partner or partners include operating and 
maintaining the facility after construction. Similar to DB contracts, DBOM contracts seek to take 
advantage of private sector incentives and specialized expertise to design and build facilities in a 
way that will also minimize operation and maintenance costs. 
Other contracts extend private participation through assistance in financing the project. In 
a typical DBFOM (design-build-finance-operate-maintain) contract, for example, the private sector 
agrees to design and build a new facility using some combination of debt (leveraged against 
future toll revenue in the toll road case) and equity, and then operates and maintains the facility 
for a specified time period in exchange for the right to collect revenues from the facility’s use over 
the lease term. This project type, in which the private sector builds a new facility, is known as a 
greenfield project. This is in contrast to a brownfield project, under which the private partner 
typically pays an upfront concession fee in order to lease an existing facility. 
Other contractual types include build-transfer-operate (BTO) agreements, under which the 
private partner actually owns the facility until its ownership rights are transferred to the public 
sector following the construction period. Similarly, under a BOT (build-operate-transfer) 
agreement, the private partner holds title to the facility until its ownership right is transferred at the 
end of the specified operation and maintenance period. In a build-own-operate (BOO) agreement, 
title remains with the private partner unless the public sector decides to purchase it. We next 
discuss four examples of these projects in the transportation sector in the United States. That 
sector has been the most widely studied so far. These examples help illustrate various contractual 
agreements and project types. 
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Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. The Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in 
Atlanta, Georgia provides an example of a management contract. It is the busiest airport in the 
world, with almost 100 million passengers and nearly 1 million air traffic operations annually. 
International Concourse E was opened in 1994, and quickly became the largest international 
concourse in North America. While most of the airport is managed by the city of Atlanta, the 28-
gate international Terminal E is managed by TBI, an international airport operator controlled by 
Abertis, a Spanish operator of tollroads, airports and other infrastructure. 
In 1994, Terminal T was replaced with new terminal E, but kept under TBI management. 
TBI managed the old Atlanta Terminal T under a 30-year management contract concluded in 
1980, which expired in 2010. Discussions focusing on a new management contract (with Abertis) 
are ongoing.
Abertis took over TBI in 2005, and Abertis Airports manages and controls many of the 
usual facilities, as well as information panels and flight runways. Hartsfield-Jackson is one of five 
airports in North America managed by Abertis Airports. 
California 91 Express Lanes. The 91 Express Lanes in Orange County, California provide an 
example of a management contract in the toll road sector. The lanes are a ten-mile (16 km) high-
occupancy toll road/full tollway combination in a highly congested section of the State. They are 
contained entirely within the median of the Riverside Freeway (State Route 91).  The 91 Express 
Lanes project was a partnership between the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) 
by California Private Transportation Company (CPTC). Prior to opening the facility to traffic in 
December of 1995, CPTC formally transferred ownership of the facility to the State. CPTC then 
leased the toll road back from Caltrans for a 35-year operating period.
A strict non-compete clause in the contract made this project controversial. The clause 
prevented any improvements, such as building mass transit or widening free lanes, along 30 miles 
of the Riverside Freeway. This includes restricting the state from widening the free lanes or 
building mass transit near the freeway. A protracted legal battle followed Caltrans’ attempt to 
widen a nearby interchange, which resulted in a settlement. 
The Express Lanes are now operated under a management contract signed in 2006 with 
Cofiroute USA.  There are no tollbooths on the lanes, and all tolls are collected electronically 
using onboard transponders. To help manage congestion, the toll lanes use time-of-day pricing 
(as opposed to real-time, variable tolling).The project was developed through a partnership 
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between the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and the California Private 
Transportation Company (CPTC). The 91 Express Lanes management contract represents a 
relatively low level of private involvement.
Chicago Skyway. The Chicago Skyway concession is an example of a long-term toll road 
leasing, or brownfield, contract. The Skyway is a 7.8-mile toll road that is part of the I-90 interstate 
highway. It connects the Dan Ryan Expressway in Chicago to the Indiana Toll Road (I-90). The 
Skyway carried about 50,000 vehicles per day in 2005.3
In March 2004, the City of Chicago issued a request for qualifications from bidders 
interested in leasing the Skyway for a ninety-nine-year term. The city received ten responses, and 
five bidders were asked to submit detailed proposals. The high bid of $1.83 billion came from a 
partnership of Cintra Concesiones de Intrastructures de Transporte S.A. (Cintra) of Madrid, Spain, 
and the Macquarie Infrastructure Group of Sydney, Australia, which cooperated to create the 
Skyway Concession Company LLC (or SCC). The city awarded the contract to SCC in the first 
modern long-term lease of an existing U.S. toll road.4
Dulles Greenway. The Dulles Greenway is an example of a greenfield DBFO contract. The 
Dulles Greenway is a 14-mile, limited-access highway outside of Washington, D.C. It extends 
from the state-owned Dulles Toll Road, which connects the Washington, D.C., beltway going to 
Dulles Airport to Leesburg, Virginia. It opened to traffic in September 1995.
The Greenway was built under the Virginia Highway Act of 1988. The 1988 act was novel 
in that it did not grant the investors—the Toll Road Investors Partnership II (or TRIP II)—the 
power of eminent domain. Rather, the lands required to build the Greenway were assembled 
privately and purchased at market price.5
3 Nicholas Hann, PPPs in North America—A Private Sector Partner’s Perspective, Maquarie North America 
Ltd., December 2006, http://csgb.ubc.ca/files/workshop06/Region4-Hann.pdf (accessed February 10, 
2010).
The Act also required that the facility eventually be 
turned over to the State. However, traffic on the road was less than expected after it opened in 
1995, and TRIP II defaulted on its debts. Its contract was thus renegotiated, and the concession 
life was increased. The road then became profitable.
4 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Innovative Program 
Delivery, “Case Studies: Chicago Skyway,” 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/case_studies/il_chicago_Skyway.htm (accessed February 10, 2010).
5 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Innovative Program 
Delivery, “Case Studies: Chicago Skyway,” 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/case_studies/il_chicago_Skyway.htm (accessed February 10, 2010).
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The Greenway’s regulation by the Virginia State Corporation Commission is also unusual. 
Its return is limited to 18 percent, similar to utility-style regulation. Unlike typical utility regulation, 
however, the Greenway receives no legally enforced monopoly through an exclusive territory. It 
continues to pay real estate taxes on property purchased to build the road, thus generating tax 
revenue that would not be forthcoming under traditional project provision in the United States.6
Tampa Bay Water at Brandon, Florida. In September 2011, Veolia Water North America and 
Tampa Bay Water in Florida began operation of the Tampa water treatment plant. This final phase 
of the project completed one of the largest design-build-operate (DBO) contracts in U.S. history. A
first phase greenfield project with Veolia was completed in 2002 with a design capacity of 60 
million gallons per day (mgd). In two more expansions leading up to September 2011, the project 
increased to 120 mgd. Tampa Bay Water chose Veolia’s consortium after receiving bids from 
other groups to carry out this DBO project. 
3. Theoretical and empirical background
Contracting out has often been subject to moral hazard problems because of full additional 
cost reimbursement under cost-plus contracts, as well as problems associated with quality 
measurement, among others (Donahue 1989; Levin and Tadelis 2010). Contracting out has 
however evolved to include high-powered incentives to help address those problems. That 
involves shifting risk to the private partner, which typically requires that the public sponsor pay a 
risk premium. Risk sharing between government and a private partner is a key issue in complex 
contracts for infrastructure provision (Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, forthcoming).
Theoretical and empirical analyses of private delivery of public services provides a useful 
background with which to study why a government will choose a contract to deliver a public 
service, as well as the degree of private involvement. There are several branches of the literature, 
which we now discuss.
6 Note that unlike traditional public production in US, some European governments create and use publicly 
owned firms that operate and collect tolls. Despite being publicly owned, they must satisfy tax payments as 
private concessionaires do.
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Public Choice theory predicts that, when politicians and bureaucrats monopolize the 
delivery of public services, overproduction and inefficiency results (Niskanen 1971). This can be 
solved by introducing competition for contracts, from which lower costs and more technical 
efficiency in service delivery can be obtained (Boyne 1998). Another relevant approach emerging 
from property rights theory builds on seminal works by Alchian (1967) and Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972). The theory of incomplete contracts developed in important works such as Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) provides a useful analytical framework for studying 
situations in which contracting is a complex operation. Within that framework, Hart (1993) and 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny al. (1997) show that private production provides incentives to reduce 
costs by means of reducing quality. That is, unless quality can be well defined and specified, the 
contracted firm may sacrifice quality in order to reduce totals costs (Bennet and Iossa, 2006). 
Contract completeness is a crucial issue regarding the choice of public services delivery, and this 
is linked directly to transaction costs (Williamson 1979, 1999). Monitoring and control thus play a 
central role in the privatization of public services (e.g. Sappington and Stiglitz 1987). 
Based on these theoretical approaches, the available literature (see Bel and Fageda 2007, 
2009 for summaries) has emphasized the relevance of different groups of factors in the decision 
to contract out: fiscal restraints, economic factors, and political factors.7 We discuss each variable 
group below.
Fiscal constraints. Fiscal constraints have been one of the main drivers of asset sale privatization 
(Yarrow 1999, Bortolotti and Milella 2008). At the local level in the United States, the trend toward 
increasing tax burdens and the consequent weakening of fiscal constraints ended in the 1970s 
(Hoene 2004). Evidence of the influence of fiscal constraints in the contracting out of public 
services is less systematic than for asset sales. Although fiscal constraints do not appear to 
influence contracting out of local services in Europe, they have been a key factor in local 
privatization in the United States (Bel and Fageda 2009). “Tax revolts” in the 1970s and states’ 
legislation limiting increases in local taxation might have been important forces in driving this 
phenomenon.8
7Hammami, Ruhashyankiko and Yehoue (2006) analyze the determinants of the extent of private participation in 
infrastructure with a sample of PPPs in a variety of undeveloped countries. They find the control of corruption and 
common law origin are positively related to the extent of private participation. The sample and institutional heterogeneity 
used in that work make it substantially different from our own.
Available evidence suggests that privatization in smaller municipalities is more 
strongly influenced by financial difficulties. Similarly, privatization can be used both to increase 
payments by users and to reduce funding from the general budget (Bel and Miralles 2010). 
Including fiscal variables designed to measure the effects of such restrictions is now common in 
8 Hoene (2004) contains an analysis on the effects of Proposition 13 on the fiscal regime of cities in California.
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the literature. The underlying hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between fiscal 
constraints and private sector involvement and privatization.
Hypothesis one: The degree of private involvement is positively related to the fiscal stress 
affecting the contracting government.
Economic efficiency and network effects. Contracting for the delivery of public services using 
private participation breaks the public delivery monopoly and introduces competition. It might also 
be a way to encourage cost reduction (Savas 1987).  Expectations of cost reduction from private 
delivery diminish when transactions costs are important (Sappington and Stiglitz 1987). According 
to Williamson (1999), the relative requirement of long-term investments specifically related to the 
transaction, or sunk costs, is a key consideration in contracting.9 Because of these factors, the 
institutional organization required to establish and uphold contracts can be very complex, 
particularly when the contract involves network industries.10 Empirical evidence suggests that 
transaction costs are negatively related to private involvement in the delivery of public services 
(Brown and Potoski 2003a, 2003b; Levin and Tadelis 2010). Evidence also indicates that cost 
reductions are less likely to be realized in services with important network characteristics, such as 
water distribution (Bel, Fageda and Warner 2010).
Hypothesis two: The degree of private involvement is negatively related to the network 
characteristics of the project, because of higher transaction costs and more complex institutional 
arrangements required. 
Hypothesis three: The degree of private involvement is positively related to the density of public 
labor force, because more public labor force can be related to higher potential for cost savings 
from private involvement. 
Political Processes and Ideological Attitudes. Variables measuring non-economic factors that 
might help explain the decision to privatize public services, such as political processes and 
ideological attitudes, have also been examined (Bel and Fageda, 2007, 2009). Two main 
motivations guide politicians’ decisions in a democratic environment. Politicians seek to win 
elections and obtain governmental positions. However, they also have preferences for some 
9 This argument can be seen as closely related to that in Besley and Ghatak (2001) regarding the impurity of the goods 
and services as per their public goods characteristics. 
10 Network industries are often defined as industries with an extensive set of lines, pipes or routes, usually with strong 
interconnections between various components of the system.
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policies over others according to their ideological predispositions.11 Within the domain of political 
interests, the decision to privatize is dependent on the existence of pressure groups focused on 
obtaining the rents derived from a given form of service delivery (see e.g. McGuire, Oshfeldt and 
van Cott (1987) for school buses; Dubin and Navarro (1988) and Hirsch (1995) for solid waste 
collection; Chandler and Feuille (1994) for sanitation; and Miralles (2009) for water). Ideology may 
also influence privatization. Right-wing parties have been linked to more pro-business policies, 
whereas left-wing organizations are often associated with public values. If those characterizations 
are correct, right-wing control of government will be positively associated with privatization, while 
left-wing control will be associated with public production, as shown in Dubin and Navarro (1988), 
Dijkgraaf, Gradus and Melemberg (2003), Walls, Macauley and Anderson (2005), and Picazo-
Tadeo et al (2012). We next describe empirical analyses examining the effects of these variable 
groups.
Hypothesis four: The degree of private involvement is positively related to the strength of 
Republican politicians. 
4. Empirical Analysis
This section describes the data, variables and methods used to evaluate the impact of 
fiscal, political, infrastructure-type and other control variables on the extent of private participation 
in U.S. projects. We first describe the main data sources and report descriptive statistics. We then 
define and discuss the dependent variables in our dataset, moving next to independent variables. 
This section ends with a discussion of the models to be estimated and a summary of predicted 
effects.
4.1 Data 
We use the International Major Projects Survey 2008 from Public Works Financing
11 This double dimension of the politician in a democratic system has been named the citizen-candidate approach. 
Osborne & Slivinski (1996) and Besley & Coate (1997) offer theoretical insights; Levitt, 1996 and Lee et al., 2004 offer 
empirical support.
(published in the October 2008 issue) as our main data source. This source contains information 
on infrastructure projects with private participation from around the world. For the United States, 
we located 508 projects between 1985 and 2008, although necessary information on contract 
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types is only specified for 472.12 The data provide detailed information on projects for different 
sectors, and on a wide range of contract types, which is important for construction of our 
dependent variables measuring the intensity of private involvement. 
Table 1 displays basic information regarding sectors and services represented in the data, 
as well as sector characteristics. Recall that we are not interested here in the choice between 
public and private delivery, so our sample is restricted to projects were private involvement 
actually exists. Table 2 shows the distribution of projects by sector characteristics and by type of 
contract. The data span a variety of sectors and services with very different economic or 
infrastructure characteristics. Network transportation and water are prevalent in the data, 
representing 26.5 and 31 percent of the sample respectively. There are, however, a significant 
percentage of projects in stand-alone facilities and non-network transportation sectors like ports 
and airports. These projects are governed by different contract types. Management contracts (23 
percent) and BOT-type contracts (31 percent) are the most frequent. There are, however, several 
other contract types in the sample, such as design-build (15 percent), concessions (7 percent) 
and leveraged agreements (19 percent). Asset sales (1 percent) and joint development 
agreements (3 percent) are much less important.
Table 1
Description of the International Major Projects Survey 2008 for the United States. Sectors 
and Services included
Sectors and 
Services 
Sector Characteristics
1 Roads Network Transportation
2 Rail Network Transportation
3 Airports Non-Network Transportation
4 Ports Non-Network Transportation
5 Water Water/Network Services
6 Prisons Stand-alone Facilities
7 Housing Stand-alone Facilities
8 Post Office Stand-alone Facilities
9 Schools Stand-alone Facilities
10 Waste Stand-alone Facilities
11 Parking Stand-alone Facilities
12 Military Housing Non-Network/Military
13 Street Lights Other
14 Space Flight centers Other
15 Sports Other
16 Shuttles Other
Source: International Major Projects Survey 2008, Public Works Financing.
12 Unfortunately, missing information on some characteristics prevents us from using a non-trivial share of this sample, 
as will be shown in the results section.
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Table 2
The distribution of projects according to sector characteristics and type of contract in the 
2008 International Major Projects Survey
Characteristics Nº % of 
sample
Contract Types Nº % of 
sample
Network Transportation 125 26.5 Management Contracts 109 23.1
Non Network Transportation 29 6.1 Leverage 91 19.3
Water Sector/Network Services 170 36.0 Joint Development 14 3.0
Facilities 61 12.9 Concession 34 7.2
Military 78 16.5 Asset Sale 5 1.0
Other 9 1.9 Design and Build 72 15.3
472 100 BOT Type contracts 1 147 31.1
472 100
Source: International Major Projects Survey 2008, Public Works Financing.
1. This group includes the following contracts: BOT, BOO, BOOT, BTO, DBFO, DBO, DBM,   DBOM, 
DFBO, etc.
4.2. Dependent Variables
We next discuss the dependent variables in our data set. We divide our dependent 
variables into two types: a four-category ordered contract variable and a binary contractual 
variable. We discuss each in turn.
4.2.1 Ordered Contract 
This is an ordered categorical variable that assigns low values to projects with low private 
involvement (and consequently low private risk assumption), and high values to projects with 
higher private participation. In Table 3 we present the type of contracts and values designated 
according to the extent of private involvement.
Table 3
Categorical dependent variable
Type of contract Private
involvement
Risk Sharing
Design and Build 1 VERY LOW
Management Contracts 2 LOW
Concessions and BOT-type Contracts 3 HIGH
Asset Sale 4 VERY HIGH
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Design and built (DB) contracts receive the lowest value. The private partner designs and 
constructs but does not operate the infrastructure. Although DB contracts involve relatively large 
initial investments, and the private partner may face risks encountered in construction and design, 
the private partner does not assume demand risk, so they are relatively low-risk in the spectrum of 
contracts. The unique difference between Design-Build contracts and traditional procurement for 
construction is the responsibility of the private partner in the link between design and construction. 
Therefore, there is a larger transfer of responsibility from the public to the private sector. However, 
the contractor does not bear demand risk. The next level of private involvement is management 
contracts. In these contracts, private operators simply manage existing infrastructure, such as 
Terminal E in Atlanta, and few if any new investments are employed. Although these contracts are 
subject to demand risk, the overall level of risk for the private partner is low. 
Concessions and build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts are the next category, receiving a 
value of three. Under a BOT approach, the private partner builds and operates the facility for a 
pre-specified time period. Transfer of facility title back to the public sponsor occurs at the end of 
that period. Under this approach, the private partner typically assumes substantial risk associated 
with the facility’s construction and operation, such as demand risk. 
The final category is the asset sale. In this type of contract, the private partner actually 
acquires title to the facility, and assumes all attendant risks associated with its ongoing operation, 
maintenance and refurbishment. We assign this category a value of four, which reflects the 
highest degree of private involvement and risk assumption.
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Our categorization of contract types, which combines the degree of private involvement 
and the level of risk assumed by the private partner, is relevant for public policy. It is consistent 
with categorizations made by institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2008) and 
the United Nations (UNECE, 2008), among others. Figure 1 illustrates this with the classification 
proposed by the Canadian Council for Public-Private-Partnerships.
Figure 1. Risk transfer and Private sector involvement by contract type
Degree of Private Sector Risk
PPP
Models
                   Degree of Private Sector Involvement
Source: Models of  Public-Private-Partnerships. The Canadian Council for Public Private 
Partnerships (http://www.pppcouncil.ca/resources/about-ppp/models.html Accessed on August, 
30th, 2012) 
Design and Build
Operation-Maintenance
Build-Finance
Design-Build-Finance-Maintain
Design-Build-Finance-Maintain-Operate
Concession
Privatization
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4.2.2 Binary Contract 
Both management and DB contracts carry significantly lower levels of risk relative to asset 
sales or concession/BOT-type contracts. We thus created a dummy variable assuming a value of 
zero if the project is a DB or management agreement. This variable is assigned a value of one for 
all other contract types, in which we include concession and BOT-type agreements (DBFO, DBO, 
DBM, BOO, DBOM, etc.), as well as asset sales. This variable thus captures contracts with a high 
degree of private involvement, and therefore large private investment and risk assumption.
4.3. Independent Variables
We next discuss our independent variables, categorizing them into fiscal variables, political 
variables, economic characteristics, basic controls, and regional dummy variables. We discuss 
each  in turn, and provide a definition of the variable with its interpretation and anticipated effect.
a) Fiscal variables
Tax Burden: Tax revenues divided by income in the state where the project is signed in the 
year prior to the agreement. This variable controls for fiscal pressure and the ability of 
governments to raise money from taxpayers in a given state. We expect this variable to be 
negatively correlated with the level of private involvement through the project because states with 
larger revenues are likely to be less reliant on private investment. The source for this variable is 
The Tax Foundation’s tables entitled “State and Local Tax Burdens: All Years, One State 1977-
2008.”13
Debt Stress: State debt outstanding (in millions of current dollars) divided by state income in 
the year prior to the project agreement. This captures states with fiscal stress resulting from 
relatively high debt levels. We expect a positive relationship between Debt Stress and private 
participation in projects. In this case, public officials seek private sector participation to help 
address fiscal constraints. The data source for this variable is the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States
13 Available at: 
, Tables entitled: "State and Local Governments -- Expenditures and Debt by State"
(various years).
http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/topic/9.html (accessed August 29, 2012).
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Bond Rating: Current-year Standard & Poor’s State Bond Rating, where alphabetical 
rankings are converted into a numerical index. States with higher ratings can obtain bond 
financing at lower cost than those with low ratings, thus lowering the cost of traditional 
infrastructure financing. Such states will be less in need of private participation. This suggests a 
negative effect of a state’s bond ratings on the level of private participation. We use Standard and 
Poor’s ratings of state-issued debt. 
Contract Size: Project size (or cost) in thousands of U.S. dollars divided by the region’s gross 
domestic product. Inexpensive projects can be undertaken by states with even modest resources. 
Moreover, administrative costs generated by long-term contracts where different aspects of the 
services are bundled are large and tendering periods are long. Because of this, for example, the 
U.K. Treasury currently considers PFI projects of less than UK£ 20m as poor value for money 
(HM Treasury, 2006). Instead, expensive projects might require private participation in order to 
share investment costs and/or risks. We thus expect a positive effect of project cost on the degree 
of private involvement. The data source for this variable is the monthly newsletter Public Works 
Financing.
b) Economic efficiency and network effects
Network: A binary variable assigned a value of one for road, rail, and water projects, zero 
otherwise. These industries enjoy network characteristics and are usually defined as natural 
monopolies. They are associated with sunk investments, larger transaction costs, and lower levels 
of competition. Smaller efficiency gains are therefore expected from private participation in these 
projects. We expect network characteristics to have a negative effect on the degree of private 
participation. The data source for this variable is Public Works Financing.
Point-to-Point (non-network transportation): A binary variable assigned a value of one for 
port and airport projects, zero otherwise. This type of transport infrastructure does not belong to a 
network and is usually operated as a stand-alone entity, facing varying degrees of competition. 
We expect larger efficiency gains from this type of private involvement. We predict that this 
variable will positively impact the extent of private participation in projects. The data source for 
this variable is Public Works Financing.
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Facilities: A binary variable set to one for prisons or post office projects, zero otherwise. 
Similar to the previous variable, we expect efficiency gains from private involvement. We thus 
predict that there will be a positive relationship between Facilities and the extent of private 
participation in projects. The data source for this variable is also Public Works Financing.
Others: A binary variable set to one for a miscellaneous set of projects such as parking 
garages, waste treatment facilities, and shuttles, zero otherwise. This combines all projects not 
included in the previous three variables. Regarding the network vs. non-network characteristic, 
these are stand-alone projects that are typically not part of a network. We thus expect this 
variable to have a positive impact on the degree of private involvement in projects. The data 
source for this variable is Public Works Financing.
Public Servants pc: State and local full-time public employees (in thousands) per inhabitant 
in the year in which the project was signed. Public servants per capita measures the likely 
intensity of public labor opposition to private involvement. However, it is also indicative of greater 
potential cost savings derived from private management of labor and assets. We use this variable 
to account for the size of the public sector labor force. The source for this variable is the Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, Tables entitled: "State and Local Governments -- Expenditures and 
Debt by State" (various years).
c) Political variables
Republican legislature: Share of votes cast for the Republican Party in the state legislative 
election prior to the project agreement. This political sentiment variable captures a business 
friendly and general market orientation associated with the Republican Party. Democrats may be 
predisposed to use public resources, while Republicans may be more likely to rely on the private 
sector. The data source for this variable is Michael Barone’s Almanac of American Politics
(various years).
Republican Governor: This is a dummy variable assigned a value of one if the governor in 
place when the project is signed is Republican, zero otherwise. Similar to the above, we expect 
that Republican governors will be more business friendly and more market oriented than 
Democratic governors. The data source for this variable is also Barone’s Almanac of American 
Politics (various years).
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d) Control variables
Income pc: State income per capita in constant 2009 U.S. dollars. We use constant dollar 
terms in order to avoid problems related to time and inflation in a pooled sample composed of 
projects signed in different years. Citizens’ purchasing power in a state will positively influence 
private investors’ decisions regarding how much to invest, particularly for user-funded projects. 
However, users are also taxpayers, and richer areas are likely to provide more public funds –
through greater tax revenue – that will help in undertaking public investments. Alternatively, richer 
areas may be more attractive to private investors. More public funding is likely to lead to lower 
private involvement in projects. Therefore, we do not have a clear prediction for the effect of this 
variable. The source for this variable is The Tax Foundation’s, tables entitled “State and Local Tax 
Burdens: All Years, One State 1977-2008.”14
Population: State population (in thousands). This variable captures the size of the market 
where the project is signed. Private investors are likely to be more interested in providing facilities 
in highly populated markets. We expect that larger state populations will result in greater private 
involvement. The data source for this variable is the Statistical Abstract of the United States,
Tables entitled: "State and Local Governments -- Expenditures and Debt by State" (various 
years).
Sponsor: Categorical variable assigned a value of one if the project sponsor is a local 
government, two if a state government and three if the federal government. Higher levels of 
government typically receive more public resources, so we expect a negative impact of this 
variable on the degree of private participation in projects. The data source for this variable is 
Public Works Financing.
14 Available at: http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/topic/9.html.
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e) Regional variables
DWest : Dummy variable assigned a value of one for states in the U.S. census region 
designated as “west,” zero otherwise.
DNortheast: Dummy variable assigned a value of one for states in the U.S. census region 
designated as “northeast,” zero otherwise.
DSouth: Dummy variable assigned a value of one for states in the U.S. census region 
designated as “south,” zero otherwise.
DMidwest: Dummy variable assigned a value of one for states in the U.S. census region 
designated as “midwest,” zero otherwise.
5. Estimation Strategy
We use different models to evaluate the impact of fiscal, political, economic and control 
variables on the extent of private participation in completed projects. These considerations affect 
our choice of econometric model. Our sample is a pool of projects signed in the United States 
between 1985 and 2008. We cannot follow particular projects across time however. 
Given the limitations of OLS for discrete and binary dependent variables, our main 
estimates utilize ordered logit and standard logit models, where estimates are robust to 
heteroskedasticity for ordered categorical discrete variables (Ordered contract) and binary 
variables (Binary Contract), respectively.15 Indeed, the literature on privatization has focused more 
on the decision of whether to privatize (contract out) or not, which has expanded the use of logit 
and probit models in this field. One of our key contributions in addition to the new approach we 
take to studying privatization – the extent of private participation once the contracting out decision 
has been made – allows us to use models that consider different privatization intensities. We 
utilize models applicable to categorical ordered discrete dependent variables. 
15 However, the use of ordered logit also introduces some limitations due to its underlying assumptions. It 
assumes a monotone one dimensional relationship between the latent and unobserved variables. 
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We use an ordered multinomial logistic model to estimate private participation in contracts 
(Ordered Contract). The ordered logit model is based on a continuous latent variable specified as 
a linear equation in (1):
* ' ,i i iy x  
*
iy    (1)
where yi* (unobserved) measures the degree of private participation in the contract, xi is a vector 
of factors explaining yi*, with associated parameters . The error term  indicates the effect of all 
unobserved factors on yi*. Assuming that yi is the observed discrete variable reflecting different 
levels of private involvement for project i, the relationship between the latent variable and the 
observed variable is obtained according to:
   
* 1iy  if 
*
1iy 	 
  i = 1...., n. (2)
* 2iy  if 
*
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*
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*
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   i = 1...., n.
The ’s are the estimated thresholds where the discrete observed responses are defined. This 
model estimates the probability that project i sustains private involvement of level j or lower 
(j). The model specification is:
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, j = 1,....,n (3)
where 	j is the cumulative probability,  is the vector of parameters (1, 2,…, K) and xi is the 
vector of regressors. Parameter estimates are obtained by maximum likelihood. 
The first specification of the above models (Specification 1 below) considers all variables 
(except regional dummies) that could be correlated with fiscal, political and demographic 
variables.16 In contrast, Specification 2 includes regional dummies, where southern states are the 
omitted category. We apply ordered logit and logit models to both specifications.
16 In fact, we find some large pair correlations between the dummy variables DNortheast and DSouth with fiscal 
variables like Debt Stress.
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Specification 1
                                     
(4)
Specification 2
         (5)
We applied a specification error test and a multicollinearity diagnostic to these models, which 
generate satisfying results.17 The first test for specification error (linktest in STATA) shows the 
meaningfulness of the covariates chosen, the absence of omitted variable bias, and a correct 
assumption for the specified link function. The second test for multicollinearity (variance inflation 
factors) finds no significant collinearity in our specification.18
17 Linear predicted p-value = 0.000 and squared predicted p-value = 0.213
18 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) = 1.61 < 10 (Rule of thumb)
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6. Model Estimation
Our main estimates are displayed in Table 4 below. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates 
without regional variables. Generally, all variable groups (except the political group), display 
significant coefficient estimates. Fiscal variables, infrastructure-type variables, and controls all 
contribute to determining the intensity of private participation in the contract. This is consistent 
with joint tests of the significance of the major variable groups. The p-values for significance tests 
for fiscal variables is 0.04, for political variables it is 0.21, for infrastructure type it is 0.00, and 0.00 
for controls.
Within the fiscal variable category, tax burden and debt stress display the expected
negative and positive signs, respectively, and both appear statistically significant with and without 
regional dummies in the specification (restricted and extended models). In the case of the bond-
rating variable, we do not find any significant relationship with contract type. Regarding contract 
size, we do not find statistical significance for specification 1, in which we apply the ordered logit 
models without regional controls. We obtain the same finding when we apply the logit model in 
which we change the dependent variable from a categorical ordered variable to a binary variable. 
We interpret this result as driven by the fact that contract size alone does not relate to contract-
specific risks. For instance, a large contract with no demand risk may be more appealing for 
private contractors than small contracts with demand risk.
Our main focus is on the infrastructure characteristics of the sector in question and their 
importance for the degree of private participation. Because we use the contracts for network 
infrastructure (water, road and rail) as a reference category, we compare results for the other 
sectors to this base category. The coefficient associated with the binary variable of point-to-point 
transport infrastructure (airports and ports) is highly significant and positively related to the extent 
of private participation. Similar results are obtained for the coefficient associated with Facilities.
Marginal effects are presented in Table 5 for the logistic estimation in order to provide a 
magnitude of the effect found. The first column (minmax) shows the estimated change in 
predicted probability as x changes from its minimum to its maximum. The second column displays 
the partial derivative (instantaneous change) of the predicted probability/rate with respect to a 
given independent variable.
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Hence, contracts with larger private participation and private risk assumption appear more 
frequently for those infrastructure types and in those facilities not displaying network 
characteristics. In addition, their coefficients show how these properties play a central role in 
project involvement. This confirms our main hypothesis: network attributes are a key determinant 
of the extent of private participation. This is consistent with previous literature on the influence of 
transaction costs and limited expected efficiency gains with private delivery of public services.
According to our estimates, political variables do not explain contract choice, supporting 
arguments about the pragmatic origins of the private participation decision rather than an 
ideological position. Regarding controls, the coefficient associated with the number of public 
servants per inhabitant is statistically significant across models. According to our estimates, 
jurisdictions with more public servants tend to sign contracts with larger private participation, 
perhaps due to the potential cost savings associated with the private management of labor and 
asset resources. Population is only significant in the logistic regression, although it appears 
significant at 5 percent, showing a positive and strong correlation between the number of 
inhabitants (and therefore potential users or customers, i.e. market size), and private involvement.
Finally, sponsor’s level of government (local, state, or federal) affects private participation. 
There is more private involvement in projects sponsored by local governments than by their 
federal or State-level counterparts. The high statistical significance is consistent across restricted 
and extended models and different estimation strategies. The other control variables do not show 
any statistically significant relationship with contract choice. 
The introduction of regional variables (extended model) in specification 3 leads to similar 
conclusions.19 The partial correlation between these variables and some fiscal variables affects 
their coefficients. However, most of the previous results are unchanged, particularly in the case of 
infrastructure or service characteristics. In fact, none of these variables seem to explain by itself 
(ceteris paribus) changes in the contract decision, so we do not find regional patterns. As a result, 
differences in the regional choice of contracts could be mainly related to a jurisdiction’s fiscal 
characteristics.
19 We do not perform logistic regressions extending the standard model with regional variables because 
these variables do not add anything to the explanatory power of the model and do not appear statistically 
significant. The other coefficients behave consistently after their inclusion, with the exception of fiscal 
variables, as happens in the ordered logistic model. 
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Table 4
Ordered Logistic and Standard Logistic Estimates for Type of  Contract
Regressors
Ordered Logit
(1)
Logit
(2)
Ordered Logit
(3)
Fiscal Variables
Tax Burden -0.2405**
(-2.03)
-0.2841**
(-2.19)
-0.2241
(-1.65)
Debt stress 0.0751*
(1.84)
0.0673
(1.54)
0.0700*
(1.72)
State Bond Rating 0.0732
(0.53)
0.1269
(0.91)
0.602
(0.42)
Contract Size 0.0497
(0.18)
0.0413
(1.39)
0.0101
(0.36)
Efficiency and type of infrastructure
(Base Category: Network)
Point to Point 2.141***
(3.93)
2.6021***
(2.84)
2.145***
(2.80)
Facilities 1.959**
(2.43)
1.8834***
(2.62)
1.940***
(3.80)
Other 2.037***
(4.09)
1.5433*
(1.68)
2.116***
(3.84)
Public Servants pc 8.03e-07*
(1.78)
4.82e-07
(1.50)
7.65e-07*
(1.70)
Political Variables
Republican Governor -0.2233
(-0.83)
-0.4525
(-1.56)
-0.2546
(-0.87)
Republican Legislature -0.8388
(-0.54)
-1.6364
(-0.85)
-1.080
(-0.67)
Control Variables
Income pc 0.00001
(0.58)
-2.98e-06
(-0.13)
0.00001
(0.58)
Population 0.0001
(1.56)
0.0001**
(2.53)
0.00003
(1.56)
Sponsor -1.143***
(-3.49)
-0.8539***
(-2.68)
-1.149***
(-3.51)
Regional Variables
North East - -0.0834
(-0.18)
Midwest - -0.2124
(-0.49)
West - 0.2246
(0.47)
N. Observations 280 280 280
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.13 0.09
Log Likelihood -267.55 -169.02 -264.41
Wald (Chi2) 37.25*** 47.51*** 34.44***
Note: Robust- to- heteroskedasticity Z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%, 
**5% and *1%, respectively.
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Table 5 
Changes in Predicted Probabilities for Contract Choice.
Regressors min->max Marginal Effect
Point to Point 0.4050 0.6420
Facilities 0.3604 0.4647
Other 0.3003 0.3808
7. Summary and Conclusions
To our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to examine the determinants of the choice of 
contract types across a range of economic sectors. This is an improvement over the traditional 
approach examining a binary public versus private decision. Study of the extent of private 
involvement in projects across sectors offers the first evidence about the role of fiscal, political 
and infrastructure-type characteristics in driving the degree of private involvement. With that goal 
in mind, we focus on four types or groups of contracts in the United States, representing an 
increasing role for private participants and a greater transfer of risk to private partners: simple 
design-and-build contracts, management contracts, BOT-type contracts, and asset sales. 
We examined several variable groups that may affect contract choice, including fiscal and 
political variables. However, our main focus is on the role played by variables measuring whether 
or not the infrastructure in question is part of a network. Indeed, this characterization of single 
versus network infrastructure is a leading driver of private participation: private involvement is 
more likely in the case of point-to-point infrastructure and facilities, and less likely for network 
infrastructure. The estimated effect of switching from network to stand-alone or point-to-point is 
substantial. 
Our models indicate that the probability of having large private involvement in single 
projects is much larger than in network infrastructure. This effect remains after controlling for a 
variety of additional factors in our analysis, such as fiscal, political, management, and control 
variables, among others. 
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These findings have important implications for public policy. They are consistent with the 
general observation that network infrastructure is associated with sunk investments, larger 
transaction costs, and lower levels of competition. Smaller efficiency gains from private 
participation may be expected in such cases, which may help explain why private involvement is 
limited in these project types. Our findings also suggest that jurisdictions new to this type of 
contracting may have a better initial experience with facilities or point-to-point infrastructure, and 
should begin with those. However, further theoretical research is necessary to better understand 
this relationship. 
Political variables do not explain a significant portion of the extent of private involvement in 
projects, but we do find that fiscal variables are, as a group, an important determinant, and that a 
jurisdiction’s level of debt-stress is an important driver of the level of private involvement in 
contracts, as is the jurisdiction’s tax burden. In addition to other control variables, our model 
permits a preliminary assessment of the origins and explanations behind how governments 
choose the level of private involvement in contracts. This is a step beyond the standard approach 
of focusing on a binary privatization decision, and hopefully improves our understanding of the 
specific forms of relational agreements between government project sponsors and private sector 
partners.  
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